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 Threshold eﬀects in coral reef
ﬁsheries
1 Introduction
Coral reefs are signiﬁcant for human welfare because they produce a wide range
of natural resources and ecosystem services. They are crucial for ﬁsheries because
they provide essential shelter for reproduction of many ﬁsh species that live as
adults in the open sea. They also oﬀer services such as recreation opportunities,
nutrient cleaning, and protection from sea erosion. Recent concerns about bleaching,
overﬁshing, and eutrophication indicate that human activities may aﬀect the way
in which coral reefs evolve over time. This may jeopardize future use of goods and
services produced within reefs.
This paper focuses on the eﬀects of ﬁshing in coral reefs and the reefs’ potential
for sustainable resource production. Coral reefs may have at least two stable states:
coral-dominated and algae-dominated. Scheﬀer et al. [34] pointed out that sudden
drastic changes to a contrasting state can interrupt smooth changes in such ecosys-
tems. Such shifts typically occur when some kind of threshold is crossed. Shifts
between coral-dominated and algae-dominated states aﬀect the reefs’ capacities to
sustain production of resources and services. This paper models the economics of
ﬁsheries in a coral reef that may shift between two diﬀerent states. Classic results
for open access and sole ownership are revisited. Though the analysis focuses on
coral reefs, it could apply to any ﬁsheries where there are threshold eﬀects similar
to the ones observed in coral reefs.
The economics of ﬁsheries tends to rely upon Schaefer-type biological models
(Schaefer [32]), which usually represent ﬁsh biomass growth using a logistic function.
This is the case in the two seminal papers that modeled the economics of ﬁsheries in
a static and a dynamic setting, respectively (Gordon [13] and Scott [35]). Smith [39]
provided a theoretical ground for dynamic open-access models of natural resources.
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Plourdes [30] used optimal control to determine the optimal rate of harvest for a
renewable resource such as ﬁsheries. In 1976, Clark [8] attempted to study multi-
cohort ﬁsheries but pointed out that analytic solutions were diﬃcult to produce.
Munro and Scott [26] reviewed the principal results in the economics of ﬁsheries and
drew attention to problems that the common property nature of ﬁshery resources
creates.
Research inspired mainly by Holling [18] [19] presented new ways to model ecosys-
tems. Scheﬀer [33] and Carpenter and Cottingham [6] studied shallow lakes. These
researchers—independently of one another—derived a nonlinear model with one state
variable, where the nonlinearity had a sigmoid form. Using this model, they showed
that large nutrient loads into a lake could induce a ﬂip from a clear to a turbid
state. Several economists, working in collaboration with ecologists, have used this
model to produce new results for management of such lakes.1 In particular, Brock
and Starrett [4] gave a complete treatment of the optimal management of a deter-
ministic version of a lake model. Mäler et al. [25] and Xepapadeas et al. [42] derived
the resource use that would result if the lake was managed under common pro-
perty. They also provided conditions under which the optimal management solution
could be obtained using taxes. Wagener [41] showed that heteroclinic bifurcation2
manifolds limit the parameter region for which Skiba points3 occur–for one state
control systems with one co-state variable. He gave a local criterion that ensures
the existence of Skiba points in systems with small discount rates.
All these papers modeled thresholds using a ﬂipping mechanism that smoothly
went between a low and a high level, without jumps. In contrast, Nævdal [28] mo-
deled optimal regulation of eutrophying lakes, fjords, and rivers in the presence of
what could be called hard thresholds. He used a dichotomous function that instan-
taneously jumped between a high and low level when the threshold was crossed.
This implied that there must be jumps in shadow prices when the threshold was
trespassed. Smooth thresholds seem more appealing for at least two reasons: One
convenient reason is that while the functional form is more complicated for a smooth
1See Carpenter, Ludwig and Brock [7], Carpenter, Brock and Hansson [5], Mäler, Xepapadeas
and de Zeeuw [25], Brock and Starrett [4], and Xepapadeas, de Zeeuw, and Mäler [42].
2A heteroclinic bifurcation occurs when the unstable separatrix of a saddle becomes the stable
separatrix of another saddle (Hubbard and West [20]).
3Initial states for which trajectories going to diﬀerent steady states yield the same welfare level
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threshold, jumps in variables can be avoided. They would require using heavy mo-
deling tools. Another reason is that natural scientists, who should be better in-
formed about the topic than economists, seem to prefer a smooth way of modeling
thresholds4.
Section 2 explains typical features of coral reefs and presents a model where algae
and ﬁsh play a major role in coral reefs’ dynamics. Section 3 shows how to model
ﬁshing and how uncertainty about some parameter values may aﬀect the outcome.
Section 4 models and discusses the eﬀects of open access ﬁsheries. Section 5 models
sole ownership. Section 6 simulates both management models using a speciﬁc cost
function. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2 The coral reef ecosystem
2.1 Typical features5
A typical coral reef is a colony of up to tens of thousands of tiny animals (polyps).
Inside each animal lives a microscopic form of algae, the zooxanthellae, which color
the corals and provide them with food through photosynthesis. In exchange, the
corals contribute with food for the microscopic algae and with protection from many
predators that live in the reefs. Reefs, in turn, supply a habitat for many marine
species. Reefs also act as nurseries for several thousand species that can spend the
rest of their lives in the oceans’ open waters (Davidson [11]).
Coral reefs are known for their beauty, high biological diversity, high produc-
tivity, and complex dynamics. Their high productivity makes them indispensable
to some tropical marine ecosystems and hence to local people. Coral reefs produce
many goods and services, such as tourism, ﬁsh, coastal protection, and ingredients
for medicines. They also sustain other ecosystems such as mangroves (Hoegh and
Guldberg [17]).
Coral reef specialists generally agree that coral reefs can assume at least two
stable forms: coral-dominated and algae-dominated. The algae-dominated state
can eventually lead to mass coral mortality, possibly followed by depletions of reef
4See Murray [27], Gurney and Nisbet [14], Scheﬀer [33], and Carpenter and Cottingham [6].
5I thank Miriam Huitric from the Beijer Institute for many discussions on coral reefs and hints
about relevant literature. Any mistakes are mine.36 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
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Figure 1: Coral reef model
ﬁsheries. Physical and biological erosion may then make it diﬃcult for the coral
population to recover6 (Done [12]). The algae-eating ﬁsh are pointed out as an
important factor for regulating algae through grazing (Hughes [21]).
2.2 Modeling a coral reef
The complexity that characterizes coral reefs implies that it is diﬃcult to model
their dynamics in a simple way. Figure 1 shows a ﬂow model of what seem to be the
main interactions in a coral reef. This paper focuses on the areas that are circled.
Except for ﬁshing, the remaining parts enter as parameters.
Two diﬀerential equations build a coral reef model. They show changes in bio-
mass of algae (A) and ﬁsh (H) at time (t), respectively. Fish play a crucial role
because they feed on algae, thereby limiting their biomass. Appendix A contains
6In Jamaica, for example, a combination of overﬁshing, damage from hurricanes, and diseases
mostly threaten the corals. Latent damages due to overﬁshing implied that the synergistic eﬀects of
hurricanes and diseases lead to a major shift in the reef, toward an algae-dominated state (Hughes
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the model developed for the purpose of this paper7. For computational purposes,
the model is rewritten in a dimensionless form to reduce the number of parameters
to those necessary for the dynamics.
Algae grow by absorbing a given load of nutrients n. In this stylized model, a
load of nutrients n gives n new algae. Algae die naturally at a rate d. Fish eat algae
at a rate e per ﬁsh. So the equation of motion for algae is:
·
A = n − dA − eAH
Fish have a logistic growth with the growth rate normalized to 1. The ﬁsh biomass
that is sustainable in absence of any predation, also called carrying capacity, is equal






represents ﬁsh biomass growth.
Predators consume ﬁsh. They are usually very mobile and search for spots where
prey are abundant and abandon spots where prey are scarce. A model that includes
spatial aspects and predator migration between diﬀerent spots would be a realistic
way to represent coral reef dynamics. Such a model would also be rather complex.
For simplicity, predator biomass is assumed constant in time and enters the model
only through a predation rate. The eﬀects of a variable predator population can be
partly controlled by analyzing changes in predation rate.
Predation has a sigmoid form. It is low below a threshold value at which a
switch occurs and predation becomes high, reaching its saturation value. When ﬁsh
biomasses are small, predators spend most of the time searching for food. When the
biomasses increase, the propensity to ﬁnd food increases and is convex. When the
threshold is realized ﬁsh are so abundant that searching for food requires little time.
Rather, most time can be spent ingesting food. If ﬁsh biomasses further increase,
the saturation point is reached, and time is spent ingesting food. The propensity to
ﬁnd food is still increasing, but it is now concave.
Let f be the rate of predation deﬁned in appendix A. The threshold between low
and high predation, also called half-saturation ﬁsh biomass, is normalized to 1. In
other words, for a ﬁsh population of one unit, predators could catch half the amount
of food they would have caught if they did not have to spend time searching for food.
Predation can be written
fHq
1+Hq, where q>1 is a constant that aﬀects the curvature
of the sigmoid function. The higher the q, the steeper the predation is around the
7I thank Stephen Carpenter (Center for Limnology, University of Wisconsin) for showing and
explaining this model to me. Any shortcomings of the model are my responsibility.38 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
threshold. At the limit, when q goes toward inﬁnity, predation makes a discrete
jump between 0 and 1 when the threshold is crossed. If f =0(no predation), there











Populations of algae and ﬁsh evolve over time, following the system of diﬀerential
equations SYS1:
·










1 + Hq (SYS1:2)
Hirsh and Smale [16], Kuznetsov [24], and Takeuchi [40] presented methods to study
such dynamic systems. Appendix B shows that the ecosystem may have one, two,
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Figure 2: Phase diagram for the ecosystem
Figure 2 analyzes the system’s dynamics for the case with four steady states, in
a phase diagram drawn in the (H,A) plane. Let ζ (H)=H (1 + Hq) and ξ (H)=Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries 39










H =0 ). For H =0 ,
·
H =0regardless of the value of A. It is easy to see
that u is monotonically increasing in n and decreasing in d and e. The function v is
monotonically increasing in f and decreasing in q if H<1, it otherwise increases.





3 denote the four steady states ordered in decreasing value of
the sustained ﬁsh population. Steady state H∗
0 is a boundary state in which ﬁsh are
extinct. It is a saddle point and can only be reached from points on the vertical axes;
that is, states with no ﬁsh. H∗
1 and H∗
3 are stable. H∗
1 represents a state with many
algae and few ﬁsh in contrast to H∗
3, which is a state with many ﬁsh and few algae.
State H∗
2 is a saddle point. A trajectory that starts from any initial point in the
interior of R2
+ goes asymptotically toward one of the stable steady states. A curve,
called the separatrix, separates the two stable steady states’ basins of attraction9
(Kuznetsov [24]). The separatrix goes through saddle point H∗
2.10 Any initial state
to the right of this curve evolves toward steady state H∗
3. Any initial state to the
left of it evolves toward H∗
1. So the separatrix deﬁnes a threshold between coral-
dominated and algae-dominated states. Figure 2 illustrates some trajectories and
the approximate location of the separatrix.
Changes in parameter values aﬀect the graph levels of u and v and the number
of steady states. For relatively low u compared to v, only H∗
0 and H∗
1 remain. This
occurs when the nutrient load n is relatively low or when death rate d, consumption
rate e, or predation rate f are relatively high. For a relatively high u compared to
v, only H∗
0 and H∗
3 remain. This occurs when the nutrient load n is high enough or
when death rate d, consumption rate e, or predation rate f are relatively low.
8Note that for some parameter values (if f = 1+Hq
Hq−1 for some feasible value of H), the graph
of v (H) has discontinuities in some points; this does not seem to aﬀect characteristics of steady
states.
9These are the regions in space from which any starting trajectory goes asymptotically toward
the same steady state.
10The separatrix is the stable manifold of saddle point H∗
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3 Eﬀects of ﬁshing
This paper does not consider ﬁshing methods that aﬀect coral or algae biomass
directly. Thus ﬁshing only enters the equation of motion for ﬁsh. Fish harvest h(t)
is traditionally modeled as a function of catchability coeﬃcient η, ﬁshing eﬀort E,
the stock of ﬁsh, the number of ﬁshermen or vessels (K), and some constants α and















1 + Hq − KηEH
For positive eﬀort and catchability, ﬁshing implies that the curve representing
·
H =0








Figure 3: Eﬀects of ﬁshing
represents a phase diagram with ﬁshing. The non-ﬁshing situation is drawn as the
thinnest line. This ﬁgure helps predict some potential eﬀects of ﬁshing.
11One could also argue for modeling catchability as dependent on herbivore stocks in the ecosys-
tem. But to allow for comparisons with more traditional ﬁshery models, catchability is assumed
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• If ﬁshing pressure is relatively low, the phase diagram that represents the
ﬁshing ecosystem is topologically equivalent12 to the phase diagram for the
ecosystem without ﬁshing. So for most initial points, ﬁshing implies that
the ecosystem ends up in a topologically equivalent steady state. The only
diﬀerence is that the steady state is slightly more algae-dominated.
• The saddle point H∗
2 becomes less algae-dominated so the separatrix shifts
to the right. This implies that the algae-dominated state’s basin of attrac-
tion increases to the detriment of the coral-dominated state’s basin. Even
small changes in ﬁshing eﬀorts may then have large, long-term eﬀects on the
ecosystem. Suppose the sizes of algae and ﬁsh biomasses corresponded to the








Figure 4: Flipping mechanisms
lower curve represented
·
H =0 , algae and ﬁsh biomasses would evolve toward
the coral-dominated steady state and end up in H∗
3. Suppose that ﬁshing
increased so that the upper curve represented
·
H =0 . Suppose further that
the system was in a state near the separatrix. The separatrix would shift to
the right, the initial state ending up in the algae-dominated state H∗ 
1 ’s basin
of attraction. In the end the increase in ﬁshing eﬀort would induce a shift
from coral-domination to algae-domination. Even when ﬁshing did not cause
12See Kuznetsov [24] for a deﬁnition of topologically equivalent dynamic systems.42 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
a shift, the increase of the algae-dominated steady state’s basin of attraction
would imply higher ﬂipping risks after external shocks. Such external shocks
are, for example, ﬁsh disease and nutrient shortage.
• An increase in ﬁshing eﬀorts could have even larger eﬀects if the harvest be-
comes so large that a bifurcation occurs and the coral-dominated state disap-
pears. The only remaining stable state would be algae-dominated and would
attract all trajectories with strictly positive ﬁsh populations.
These mechanisms presume a world of complete knowledge. But in the real
world, complete knowledge may not be possible. There are many sources of un-
certainty; assume (without loss of generality) that one parameter is uncertain, for
example, consumption rate e, for which only the probability distribution is known.
Uncertainty about the consumption rate implies that the level of curve
·
A =0is
unknown. Knowledge of e’s probability distribution can only be used to state that
there is a possible 90% chance that the u graph is found between the bold curves in








Figure 5: Eﬀects of uncertainty
the true location of u’s graph. Suppose the true location was such that it was close
to the highest bold curve. Then a small harvest would only cause a slight shift in
the curve representing
·
H =0and would not aﬀect the phase diagram’s topologicalEssay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries 43
properties. The system would still go toward a steady state near the no-ﬁshing
steady state, unless the initial state was very close to the separatrix to begin with.
If u’s graph was situated near the lowest bold curve instead, then a dramatic change
could occur, even if the system was not near the separatrix to begin with. In that
case, the harvest need not be very large to cause bifurcation, and there would be
only one stable algae-dominated state left.
When there is uncertainty, a ﬂip can occur in a situation that is perceived as
business as usual and may not be observable before long after it has occurred. When
the ﬂip is observed, the intervention needed to return to the coral-dominated state’s
basin of attraction is much greater than if it would have been discovered earlier.
If a bifurcation has occurred, returning to a coral-dominated state might not be
possible unless ﬁshing is completely prohibited and new ﬁsh are introduced. These
restorations imply welfare costs for society.
To deal with parameter uncertainties, one can simulate the model with an entire
set of possible parameter values. Such simulations produce the steady states’ distri-
bution, given the parameter values’ distributions. This enables an opportunity to
localize bifurcations and determine the risks of ﬂipping.
Thus far, the ﬁshing eﬀort is exogenous. The remainder of the paper studies
management models for ﬁsheries, in which the ﬁshing eﬀort is endogenously deter-
mined. Even if all parameters are known, thresholds complicate the dynamics of
ecosystems. The analysis focuses on the eﬀects of the ecosystems’ complexities, par-
ticularly the existence of thresholds on open access (section 4) and sole ownership
(section 5).
Assume that ﬁshermen cannot inﬂuence the market outcome and sell their har-
vests at a constant price p. The ﬁshing eﬀort E is costly and can only take values
in its domain (E ∈ Ξ). The cost of ﬁshing C (E) is assumed to be increasing and
convex in eﬀort, so C￿ (E) > 0,C ￿￿ (E) > 0. The harvesting revenue is the price mul-
tiplied by the individual harvest. So a ﬁsherman’s proﬁt from harvesting at time t
is:
Π(E,H,K)=pηEH − C (E)44 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
4 Open access
4.1 The model
This section uses Smith [39] to analyze open access ﬁsheries using the model de-
veloped in section 3. Assume that reef ﬁsheries are open access. Fishermen choose
the eﬀort level to maximize their proﬁt. The condition pηH = C￿ (E) is necessary
and suﬃcient for proﬁt maximization, because proﬁt is concave in ﬁshing eﬀorts.
This means that proﬁt maximization requires the marginal cost of eﬀort to equal
the market value of the total amount of available ﬁsh. Positive proﬁts attract new
ﬁshermen while negative proﬁts drive them away. By assumption, the ﬂow of ﬁsh-
ermen is proportional to pure proﬁt, where φ>0 is a behavioral constant13 for the
ﬁshery:
·
K = φ(pηEH − C (E))
The equations of motion (SYS2) and the proﬁt maximizing condition (1) characterize
the open access ecosystem.
·










1 + Hq − KηEH (SYS2:2)
·
K = φ(pηHE − C (E)) (SYS2:3)
pηH = C
￿ (E) (1)
With cost of eﬀort being strictly convex, the marginal cost of eﬀort is an invertible
function. Equation (1) oﬀers then a unique solution: the optimal ﬁshing eﬀort is
uniquely determined for a given ﬁsh biomass. Let Eo(H) ≡ (C￿)
−1(pηH).I t c a n
be replaced for in SYS2. This gives:
·














o(H) − C (E
o(H)))
13φ could also represent some function of proﬁt. For example, a large proﬁt would give ﬁshermen
incentives to rapidly enter the market, while a small proﬁt would not attract them as quickly.Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries 45
Let Ko,A o and Ho be respectively the number of ﬁshermen, and the stocks of algae




























The number of steady states in open access depends only on the ﬁshery’s cost func-
tion as stated in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 A steady state exists if and only if the average cost is lower than
the market value of the total available ﬁsh stock for some levels of ﬁsh stock while
the opposite is true for other levels of ﬁsh stock. The steady state is unique if the
average cost is monotonous.
Proof. Once Ho and Eo are given, equations (3) and (5) uniquely determine the
algae population and number of vessels. So the number of steady states depends on
the number of positive solutions in E to equation (1) and the number of positive
solutions in H to the equation (4). Convexity of costs insures that (1) has a unique
solution. Thus the number of steady states depends on the number of ﬁx points of
equation (4).
This depends on the average cost of eﬀort as a function of ﬁsh stock. Deﬁne
C : R++ → R++,H → C (H)=
C(Eo(H))
Eo(H) , as the average cost as a function of ﬁsh
stock. Note that C is continuous by assumptions on C if ﬁshing eﬀort does not
equal zero. It is easy to graphically verify that (4) has a ﬁx point if and only if there
are at least two diﬀerent levels of ﬁsh stocks H1 and H2 such that pηH1 < C (H1)
and pηH2 > C (H2). Moreover, if the average cost is monotonous, the ﬁx point is
obviously unique, which means that the system has a unique steady state.
The predation term drives threshold eﬀects in the model. This term appears
only in equation (5) for f ￿=0 . The case f =0corresponds to a ﬁshery model with
no threshold eﬀects. Proposition 2 follows directly from equations (2-5).
Proposition 2 Steady state levels of algae, ﬁsh and eﬀort remain as if there were
no threshold eﬀects but there are fewer ﬁshermen.46 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
This result is not too surprising because ﬁshermen do not account for ecosystem
dynamics in open access. Rather, they maximize proﬁts and then decide about enter-
ing the market depending on whether the proﬁt is positive or negative. This means
that threshold eﬀects can only aﬀect the decisions of ﬁshermen through changes in
proﬁts. Thus the zero proﬁt condition implies that only the number of ﬁshermen or
vessels is aﬀected.
4.2 Comparison with unexploited reefs
The eﬀect of open-access ﬁshery on the ecosystem is better understood by comparing








Figure 6: Fishing with diﬀerent price levels for ﬁsh, K =1 0
the same conditions as in proposition 1 so that the steady state is unique. Let
w(H)=
ζ(H)
ξ(H)−KηEo(1+Hq).w ’s graph represents a projection of manifold
·
H =0
for open access ﬁshery in the (H,A)-plane. The function u’s graph represents a
projection of manifold
·
A =0 . A projection of manifold
·
K =0is a vertical line in
the (H,A) plane. Assume that the predation rate is so small that ξ (H) > 0, that
is, f<
1+Hq
Hq−1 .14 For strictly positive levels of ﬁsh populations,
w(H) >v (H) ⇔ ξ (H) >K η E
o(1 + H
q)
w(H) < 0 <v(H) ⇔ ξ (H) <K η E
o(1 + H
q)
14If this assumption did not hold we would have v (H) < 0 on some interval where herbivore
population would decrease.Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries 47
Note that in intervals where ξ (H) <K η E o (1 + Hq), ﬁsh populations continuously
decrease. If this occurs when H is small, ﬁsh may become depleted in the long run.
Note that there is a discontinuity for values of H such that ξ (H)=KηEo(1 + Hq),
corresponding to vertical asymptotes in w’s graph.
Figure 6 represents functions u, v,a n dw. The thin curves represent a price level
of 0.2 (lower curve) and 0.3 (higher curve). The number of ﬁshermen (vessels) is
arbitrarily set to K =1 0 . The fat curve represents the corresponding situation when
there is no ﬁshing. The dynamics in the (H,A) plane are similar in open access and








Figure 7: Fishing with diﬀerent price levels for ﬁsh, K =1 5
showing that the level of w increases with the number of ﬁshermen.
A steady state occurs at the point where u, w and the vertical line that represents
·
K =0in plane (H,A) intersect. Typically, there is a maximum of one such steady
state in a plane, but there might be several such planes depending on whether or not
the cost function meets the assumptions in proposition 1. Whether such a steady
state is algae-dominated or coral-dominated depends on the cost function, which
determines where
·
K =0intersect with the other curves.
In any case, the steady states are more algae-dominated compared to the un-
exploited ecosystem because for any positive number of vessels K, the w graph
lies either above the v graph or in the negative part of space. When proposition
1 holds, the only steady-state candidate is more algae-dominated than any other48 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
algae-dominated state in the unexploited ecosystem.
5 Sole ownership
5.1 The model
Suppose a sole proﬁt-maximizing ﬁsherman owned a coral reef ﬁshery: K =1 . She
controlled the ﬁsh biomass levels through a ﬁshing eﬀort E, which was her unique
control variable. Recall that harvest is h(t)=EηH for K =1 .
Assume further that the owner was knowledgeable about coral reef dynamics
and had an inﬁnite horizon (powerful but usual, convenient assumptions). She
wanted to maximize the present value of discounted proﬁts from ﬁshing given the



















1 + Hq − EηH (8)
A ≥ 0,H≥ 0,h= EηH (9)







H =0 , so the non-negativity constraints are probably not binding. Ar-
row and Kurz [1], Hestenes [15], and Seierstad and Sydsæter [37] developed methods
to solve such problems when there are constraints on state variables. Crépin [9]
shows in appendix how such constraints can be treated in a similar problem where
there are binding constraints. To simplify this problem’s solution, assume that no
constraint is ever binding. The presentation below follows Seierstad and Sydsæter.
Let H(E,A,H,λ) be the current-value Hamiltonian and λ ≡ λ(t) represent a vector
of shadow prices:
H(E,A,H,λ)=pEηH − C (E) (10)










1 + Hq −EηH
￿
The necessary conditions for E∗ to be optimal are:Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries 49
• For v.e.15 t ∈ R+,E ∗ ≡ E∗(t) maximizes H(E,A∗,H∗,λ) for all E ∈ Ξ.
Assume that at least one eﬀort level is optimal and yields a positive discounted
sum of all future proﬁt.16 Given that the Hamiltonian is concave in E, E∗ is
such a maximum if and only if:
pηH − C
  (E
∗) − λHηH ≤ 0 (11)
This remains with equality for an interior solution, which means that optimal
harvest is such that net marginal beneﬁts from harvesting equal marginal costs.
Marginal beneﬁts consist of the market value of the available ﬁsh stock (pηH).
Marginal costs are the sum of the marginal cost of eﬀort C￿ (E∗) and the total
value of the available ﬁsh stock if it remains in the ecosystem (λHηH).
• λ is continuous and has a derivative v.e. given by
·



















λ(t)(j (t) − j∗(t)) ≥ 0
• ￿ H(A,H,λ)=m a x
E∈Ξ
H(E,A,H,λ) is concave in (A,H).
Let ￿ HHH be the maximized Hamiltonian’s second derivative with regard to H.
Appendix C shows that ￿ H(A,H,λ) is concave if and only if conditions (14) and (15)
remain:
λH ≥ 0 (14)








15Following Seierstad and Sydsæter, let v.e. represent virtually every or virtually everywhere,
which includes all points except a ﬁnite, countable number.
16￿ ∞
0 (pE∗ηH −C (E∗))e−ρtdt > 0 for some E∗.50 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
With the cost of eﬀort being strictly convex, the marginal cost of eﬀort is an
invertible function. Equation (11) then has a unique solution and the optimal ﬁshing





Because C￿ is monotonously increasing, E∗ is also monotonously increasing in η,
H, and p and decreasing in λH. The equations of motion (SYS3) of the modiﬁed
dynamic Hamiltonian system are:
·










1 + Hq −E
∗(H,λH)ηH (SYS3:2)
·














+ λAeA −(p − λH)E
∗(H,λ H)η
(SYS3:4)
It is challenging to determine how many potential steady states this system may
have. One can easily see that the partial equation system (SYS3:1, SYS3:3) has a
unique steady state in (A,λA) expressed as a function of H and λH. Replacing this
solution in equations SYS3:2 and SYS3:4 gives a two-dimensional system. Normally
this is diﬃcult to solve because both equations involve polynomials of higher order
in H (and possibly in λH, depending on the cost function). So there will typically
be several values of H, which solve the system SYS3. Each of these corresponds to
a steady state of SYS3. Numerical simulations (section 6) give better ideas about
the number and characteristics of such steady states.








λH =0 ; obviously
λA and λH must have the same sign, otherwise
·
λA ￿= 0. The concavity conditions
require that λH > 0 so both shadow prices are most probably positive in an optimal
steady state’s neighborhood. This leads to proposition 3:
Proposition 3 Both algae and ﬁsh have a positive shadow price near an optimal
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5.2 Comparisons with open access and unexploited ecosys-
tems
How does the exploited ecosystem behave compared with the natural ecosystem
SYS1? Methods for analyzing such dynamic systems can be found in Brock and
Malliaris [3]. They present a series of stability results, which are diﬃcult to apply
here because the ecosystem equations are rather complicated. But it is easy to show
that the saddle-path property proven in Kurz [23] still holds true even when the
ecosystem equations are not concave. This is done in Crépin [10].
A proper phase diagram for the system would require four dimensions, but one
can imagine projections in the algae/ﬁsh plane. Recall the functions u(H),v(H),




H =0in the unexploited ecosystem
(SYS1) and in open access (SYS2) respectively (see sections 2.2 and 4.2). These
functions can represent steady algae and ﬁsh biomasses in a four-dimensional phase
diagram. They are two-dimensional manifolds in a four-dimensional space because
the dynamics of algae and ﬁsh biomasses are uncoupled from the dynamics of shadow
prices. What happens in the (H,A) plane is independent of the shadow prices in
SYS1 and SYS2.
For sole ownership, the
·
A =0manifold is also a graphic representation of u(H).
Representing the
·
H =0manifold is more challenging because it depends on shadow
prices; for that reason, it is four-dimensional. Let z be the level of algae stocks such
that
·

























solves the partial equation system (SYS3:3-
SYS3:4). The levels of algae and ﬁsh biomasses in a sole-owner managed coral
reef depend on the optimal eﬀort level and on the diﬀerence between market and
shadow prices for ﬁsh. If the market price is higher than the shadow price, a steady
level of ﬁsh population requires a larger algae population than in an unexploited
ecosystem. This means that if SYS3 has several steady states, the one that is
more algae-dominated and the one that is less algae-dominated will both become
more algae-dominated compared to corresponding steady states in the unexploited52 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
ecosystem. If the market price is lower than the shadow price, the opposite is true,
which may result in a negative ﬁshing eﬀort. If the market price for ﬁsh is low, the
owner may want to implant or insert new ﬁsh and abstain from ﬁshing for a period
of time to secure future opportunities.
Comparison with the ecosystem in open access involves comparing KEo (H)
with E∗(H,λH). Recall that K>1 and (C￿)
−1 increases monotonously because
C  does. This means that unless λH is very large and negative, K (C )
−1(pηH) >
(C )
−1(ηH (p− λH)) so KEo (H) >E ∗(H,λH). For that reason, z is typically
found below w if the shadow price for ﬁsh is positive or not too negative. When
concavity conditions are veriﬁed, z is always below w. So under usual circumstances,
such as when ﬁsh have a positive value in the ecosystem, the optimal steady level
for ﬁsh stocks is found above the corresponding level in open access.
Compared to more traditional ﬁshery models, the threshold term enters SYS3:2
and SYS3:4, so it should aﬀect the steady state levels and the number of feasible
steady states.
6 Simulations
The systems are simulated with an ad hoc cost function: C (E)=aE2+F, where a is
a positive constant, and F is a ﬁxed cost. The parameter values used for benchmark
simulation are in appendix D. With this speciﬁc cost function, the optimal eﬀort in
open access is Eo (H)=
pηH
2a and SYS2 becomes:
·
























The optimal eﬀort in sole ownership is E∗(H,λH)=
(p−λH)ηH
2a and SYS3 becomes:
·
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SYS2’s and SYS3’s steady states were simulated using MATHCAD17. Appendix E
contains a table with the values of all steady states, given the parameter values
in appendix D. The sole-owner ecosystem (SYS3) has four feasible steady states:
S3.1−S3.4. The number of steady states varies with parameter values. All feasible
steady states are saddle points. Changes in the ﬁxed cost F do not aﬀect the
sole-owner system, but parameter a does. When a increases, ﬁsh biomass tends to
increase and for a>0.05, two new steady states appear. The unique open-access
steady state S2 greatly depends on cost variables. If the ﬁxed cost is large enough
(about 0.17, given other parameter values), ﬁshermen do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
ﬁsh, which means that there are no feasible open-access steady states. The same is
true when a is larger than about 8.28.
This shows that the cost function aﬀects both management models in diﬀerent
ways. Also note that S2 is more algae-dominated than any of the feasible interior
steady states in sole ownership, which are more algae-dominated than the corre-
sponding states in the natural ecosystem. This veriﬁes the expected results from
comparisons in sections 4 and 5.
MATHCAD was used to simulate trajectories in the sole-ownership case. Using
the method of reverse shooting18, the stable manifold for each steady state could be
derived for the sole-owner ecosystem. This is pictured in ﬁgure 8.
Simulations19 using the method developed in Beyn, Pampel, and Semmler [2]
indicate the existence of Skiba points in SYS3. Skiba points are threshold points at
which trajectories toward two diﬀerent steady states yield the same welfare. Such
a point is, for example, somewhere around P =( 0 .1,3.57). Starting from P and
following the optimal path toward S3.1 or S3.3 yields the same welfare of 0.033
units. For all initial points that were tested, trajectories toward S3.2 yielded a
17MATHCAD is a computer program that can perform numeric calculations or ﬁnd general
symbolic solutions to mathematical problems.
18See Judd [22] for details on this method.
19The program codes in MATLAB can be acquired from the author54 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
Figure 8: Stable manifolds in SYS3
negative expected welfare. This indicates that S3.2 may never be an optimal steady
state. Simulations of trajectories toward S3.4 are diﬃcult to test because three of
the variables are equal to zero. This steady state may also be suboptimal because
once the stable manifold is reached, from then on, social welfare is equal to zero.
The sets of all Skiba points form this system’s Skiba manifolds. There is one
Skiba manifold for each pair of optimal steady states. Only some of these Skiba
points have been located; the task of locating them all would be too tedious. Ac-
cording to Beyn et al. [2], the Skiba manifolds’ dimension should equal the number
of state variables. So a Skiba manifold should be of dimension 2.20 To approxi-
mate the Skiba manifolds, one can use the initial state variables as continuation
parameters.
The parameters chosen for the simulation are improvised and have nothing to
do with the empirical data. Meanwhile, if the model’s general features are correct,
use of ad hoc parameters still gives qualitative results, which should be reliable for
the case studied. For the natural ecosystem and the open-access case, it is relatively
easy to check how the parameter values aﬀect the curves when varied, which may
lead to bifurcations.
20Except when there are more than two optimal trajectories from a Skiba point or when the
dimension of the stable manifold diﬀers from the number of state variables (Beyn et al [2, p. 266]).Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries 55
In the case of sole ownership, the results’ sensibility to variations of economic
parameters was studied. This showed the occurrence of bifurcations for every para-
meter tested. For some parameter values, steady states may appear or disappear.
In general, higher parameter values lead to the disappearance of some steady states.
The saddle point property seemed more robust to changes in parameter values, ex-
cept for variations in eﬀort and discount rate. For discount rates higher than about
0.4, the steady state S3.2 had three positive eigenvalues. For discount rates higher
than 1, S3.4 also had three positive eigenvalues. For high catchability (η ≥ 2),
steady state S3.3 became less stable (three eigenvalues with positive real parts).
7 Concluding remarks
This paper shows that accounting for threshold eﬀects substantially changes the
dynamics and steady states of coral reefs in open access and sole ownership.
Open-access ﬁsheries may typically cause a bifurcation toward a unique algae-
dominated steady state. This state can support fewer ﬁshermen than if there were no
threshold eﬀects. Traditional results on the ineﬃciency of open access are reinforced.
In the real world, there is open access to many coral reef ﬁsheries. In the context of
this paper’s results, the multiple concerns about eutrophication and shifting coral
reefs are not surprising. They reﬂect that the open-access coral reef ﬁsheries may
be approaching their long-term steady state, which is algae-dominated compared to
natural equilibria.
The results for sole ownership of the reefs’ ﬁsheries diﬀer substantially from those
obtained in traditional ﬁshery models. Instead of a unique steady state, threshold
eﬀects imply that the controlled system can have several steady states. Depending
on the initial state, the optimal path leads toward diﬀerent optimal states. There are
also some initial states for which several paths are optimal. This implies that even
an optimized coral reef can shift between diﬀerent states, such as after an external
shock like disease or a hurricane.
The possibility of multiple steady states implies that policy recommendations for
sole-owner ﬁshermen cannot rely on simple marginal rules such as those calculated in
traditional ﬁshery models. Owners must calculate all future beneﬁts from ﬁsheries
to rule out the paths toward steady states that are suboptimal. This is diﬃcult in an
uncertain and changing world. Meanwhile, failing to do so implies that owners face56 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
the risk of choosing the wrong path, which could result in an even more detrimental
steady state.
These results explain the need for new policy instruments in ﬁsheries. Safe
minimum standards, including ﬁshing quotas, have been used; but as Munro and
Scott [26] pointed out, this typically leads to excess capacity in the ﬁshing ﬂeet if
there is open access. The task for policy makers is much harder than previous results
indicated. They must ﬁnd some way to solve the ineﬃciency problems related not
only to open access but also to the diﬃculty in ﬁnding the best path when several
steady states may be optimal.
It may take time before a shift is discovered. This is worrisome because even if
the short-term eﬀects of a shift are small, the long-term eﬀects can be quite large
and even irreversible. For these reasons, it is challenging to try and detect ﬂips early
to make available as many management opportunities as possible. This explains the
need for work on new ways to treat such problems.
The results obtained in this paper depend on the model studied. The paper
examines the eﬀects of parameter uncertainty. In particular, mistakes about pa-
rameter values may be serious because parameter changes can cause bifurcations.
This means that even if the model is correct, bad parameter estimates may lead to
qualitatively misleading policy recommendations. In addition to that, the formu-
lation of the model is a major uncertainty. Many of the mechanisms that govern
coral reefs are still unknown to scientists, so the model used may have missed some
aspects, such as an important category of variables or some important movement
of motions. We need to better learn how to cope with this kind of uncertainty. An
important task for natural scientists is to recognize key features in ecosystems and
to be able to model them as simply as possible so that their models can become
useful for natural resource management.
A Dynamic model of coral reefs
These two diﬀerential equations may represent the dynamics in a coral reef:
·
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where x and y are the populations of algae and ﬁsh, respectively, N is a load of
nutrients, D is the natural death rate, and C is the rate of consumption by ﬁsh.
The ﬁsh population has a growth rate G and carrying capacity K per unit of algae.
F is the maximum average number of ﬁsh that predators, not including humans,
catch per unit of time. Y is the half-saturation ﬁsh population and q is a positive
constant that aﬀects the sigmoid function’s curvature.
Following Segel [36], I scaled the system to obtain a simpler dimensionless form,
which was easier to analyze. Let xu,y u and tu be the units in which algae, ﬁsh, and




yu and τ =
t
tu be dimensionless populations









































































G , and f ≡
F
YG and we obtain a dimensionless system
with the dynamic properties similar to the original system (17):
·











B N u m b e ro fi n t e r i o rs t e a d y states
A steady state of SYS1 must solve















. If ﬁsh biomass is non-
negative, A∗ =
n
d+eH∗ is the unique interior steady state of the algae biomass. Given58 Essay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries
A∗, the ﬁsh biomass in an interior steady state solves: 1 −
H
n (d + eH)=f
Hq−1
1+Hq.
So the steady state ﬁsh biomass is the value(s) of H at the intersection(s) between
the curves κ(H)=1− H
n (d + eH) and γ (H)=f Hq−1
1+Hq. The parameters are all
strictly positive, so κ is a concave function of H, and the graph of κ is a concave
parabola with the maximum at H = −
d
2e < 0. Only positive values of H are feasible
so the relevant maximum is at H =0 , which gives the intercept on the vertical axis:
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Figure 9: Graph of κ
Computation of the ﬁrst and second derivatives of γ gives
γ
￿ (H)=f





(q2 − 3q +2 )Hq − (q2 +3 q − 4)H2q +2 H3q
H3(1 + Hq)
3
So γ has a maximum of one non-negative interior extremum at H = (q − 1)
1
q.
Suppose q ≥ 2, the function γ increases from 0 until it reaches its maximum at












q ) and starts to decrease toward the
horizontal axis, which is an asymptote ( lim
H→+∞
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. For q = 2, the curve has one inﬂection point at H =
√
3.
Note that when q becomes large, the two inﬂection points approach 1: H1 from
below and H2 from above, which yield a steeper peak around the maximum at
￿ H =( q − 1)
1








Figure 10: Graph of γ for several values of q
decreasing curve), q =2(dotted curve), q =6(thin convex-concave curve), and
q =1 0 0(bold curve).
The characteristics of both functions imply that for q>1, they can intersect
once, twice, or three times, depending on the parameter values. This gives one, two,
or three interior steady states.
C Concavity conditions
￿ H(A,H,λ,µ) ≡H(E∗,A,H,λ,µ) is concave in A and H if (−1)
r ∆r ≥ 0 for r =1 ,2
where ∆r are the principal minors of order r in the Hessian for ￿ H(A,H,λ,µ). (See
Nikaido [29]). E∗(H,λ H)=( C )
−1(ηH(p− λH)) so
￿ H(A,H,λ,µ) ≡ (p− λH)(C
￿)
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So the corresponding Hessian is: ￿
￿ HAA ￿ HAH
￿ HHA ￿ HHH
￿
where ￿ HAH = ￿ HHA = 2λH
H
A2 − λAe and ￿ HAA = −2λH
H2
A3 .
The conditions for a concave Hamiltonian amount to:
• λH ≥ 0
•− 2λH
H2







So even if the shadow price of ﬁsh is positive, the second concavity condition is
not necessarily satisﬁed unless ￿ HHH is negative and large enough. These conditions
can be rewritten:
λH ≥ 0









d 1 algae death rate (per year)
e 1 share of algae eaten (per ﬁsh per year)
f 1.6 rate of predation
n 30 nutrient loading
q 4 curvature of the predation
p 0.1 price
ρ 0.02 discount rate
η 0.5 catchability
a 0.5 cost parameter
F 0.001 ﬁxed costEssay I: Threshold eﬀects in coral reef ﬁsheries 61
E Steady states
The feasible steady states (positive populations) are in bold.










SYS2 S2 15.836 0.894 10.976
284.164 −0.89443 −76.082
SYS3 −1.431E +3 −1.021 −3.795E − 3 7.212
−104.155 −1.288 −3.422E − 3 5.997
−4.975 −7.03 1.861E − 3 −5.602E − 3
S3.1 7.243 3.142 9.44E −4 0.021
S3.2 12.307 1.438 8.43E −4 0.152
S3.3 13.883 1.161 1.69E −5 5.272E −3
S3.4 30 0 0 0
34.881 −0.14 5.29E − 4 28.925
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